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I use a dynamic microsimulation model to analyse the distributional effects of an expansion of 
education in Côte d'Ivoire in the medium and long term. The simulations are performed in order to 
replicate several policies in force or subject to debate in this country. Various hypotheses 
concerning the evolution of returns to education and labour demand are tested. The direct effects 
between education and income as well as the different transmission channels, such as occupational 
choices, fertility, and household composition, are analysed. The effects of the educational expansion 
on the growth of household incomes, their distribution and poverty depend very crucially on the 
hypothesis made on the evolution of returns to education and labour demand. If returns to education 
remain constant and the labour market segmented, the effects will be very modest. 
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1 Introduction 
Today it is widely recognized that human capital, in particular that acquired by schooling, is a key 
factor of development. The link is clearly established at the micro-economic level. Individuals with 
more education receive on average more income (e.g., Mincer, 1974; Schultz 1994, 1999). This 
implies that a more egalitarian distribution of education may constitute an efficient means for 
reducing inequality of income distribution. At the macro-economic level, the “new growth theory”, 
pioneered by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990), suggests that the accumulation of human capital may 
have externalities which drive the economy on a continuous growth path. However, empirically the 
link seems less clear. Whereas Krueger and Lindahl (2000) find that faster growth of the human 
capital stock also leads to faster growth of per capita income, other authors are more sceptical. 
Pritchett (2001), for instance, claims that a rise of education can only play the “engine of growth”-
role if that rise is accompanied by a higher demand for education, if education satisfies a certain 
quality standard, and if education is not allocated to socially inefficient tasks. Education is thus 
viewed as a necessary, but not sufficient condition, or as Pritchett writes: “Education is no magic 
bullet”. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), and more recently Bils and Klenow (2000) even deny 
completely this link putting forward the argument of inverse causality, i.e. that economic growth 
accelerates human capital investments and not the other way around. 
In any case, besides the link from education to income, one attributes numerous positive 
external effects to education, in particular to women’s education: less, healthier, and better educated 
children, higher autonomy of women, and increased labour supply outside the household (e.g., 
Cleland and Rodriguez, 1988; Jejeebhoy, 1995; Schultz, 1997). Some authors even argue that an 
improvement of women’s situation may be a source of economic growth (e.g., Behrmann Foster, 
Rosenzweig et al., 1999; Blackden and Bhanu, 1999; Forsythe, Korzeniewicz and Durrant, 2000; 
Klasen, 1999). Likewise, in the Millennium Development Goals education is seen as a powerful 
instrument not only “for reducing poverty and inequality”, but also “for improving health and social 
well-being, laying the basis for sustained economic growth, and being essential for building 
democratic societies and dynamic, globally competitive economies” (United Nations, 2000). 
Whereas East and South-East Asia as well as Latin America have experienced significant 
progress in terms of education over the last decades, Sub-Saharan Africa is still far behind. This 
region has the lowest enrolment ratios at each level and the average African adult has acquired less 
than three years of schooling (World Bank, 2001). This fact raises several important questions: (i) 
Why are enrolment rates at this low level? (ii) What kind of policies may be appropriate to increase 
them? Should policies focus more on the demand side, more on the supply side, or consider both? 
(iii) What are the effects on growth and the distribution of income once enrolment rates do really 
rise? This paper focuses on the third question. More precisely, I analyse the effects in the medium 
and long term of a significant expansion of education in Sub-Saharan Africa on income distribution 
and poverty. What would be the magnitude of the direct effects between education and income? 
What would be the role of the different transmission channels, such as fertility, age at marriage, 
formation and composition of households, and labour supply? An attempt will be made to answer 
these questions for the case of Côte d’Ivoire using a dynamic microsimulation model. The 
simulations consider policies which are in force or subject to debate in this country.
1 Their impact 
                                                 
1 Today we have to say “policies which ‘were’ subject to debate in this country”. Côte d’Ivoire knows a civil war since 
September 2002. Given this crisis, the relevance of analyzing education policies for this country may seem low. 
However, the framework and the results of this study may apply to other sub-saharan countries as well.   4
on household incomes and their distribution is examined from 1998 until 2015 under several 
assumptions concerning the evolution of labour demand and returns to education.
2 
Section 1 provides a brief summary of education policies and the evolution of the 
distribution of education in Côte d‘Ivoire. Section 2 presents the microsimulation model used and 
the main transmission channels between education and income distribution. Section 3 outlines the 
policy experiments which are simulated. Section 4 analyses the simulation results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2  Education in Côte d’Ivoire 
2.1  Education System and Education Policy since Independence 
The education system in Côte d’Ivoire is based on the model inherited from the French colonial era. 
School normally starts at the age of five, but many children enter later. Children stay in primary 
school for a total of six years then move to junior secondary school (four years) and to upper 
secondary school (three years). Entrance to junior secondary school is permitted upon success to the 
“Certificat d’Etudes Primaires et Elementaire” (CEPE) examination and access to upper secondary 
school is controlled by the “Brevet d’Etudes du Premier Cycle” (BEPC). At the end of secondary 
school, each student has to pass the “Baccalauréat” examination before going to university. 
Professional training and technical education is situated mainly on the secondary level (Kouadio 
and Mouanda, 2001). 
After independence, Côte d’Ivoire allocated approximately 40% of public expenditures to 
education, more than twice the share allocated in Burkina Faso or Senegal. However, with the onset 
of the economic crisis in the beginning of the 1980s, this share decreased progressively preventing 
an improvement of the efficiency of the school system which was already judged as not satisfactory. 
A large part of education expenditure has been used for salaries. The primary school sector has been 
systematically neglected. This explains to some extent why a large part of the population, in 
particular rural and female, has received no education. Furthermore, repetition rates of 30% are 
frequent and only about 35% pass successfully the BEPC (Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps, 2003). 
2.2  Enrolment Ratios and Education Level 
The following descriptive statistics are based on two household surveys, the “Enquête Prioritaire” 
of 1993 and the “Enquête de Niveau de Vie” of 1998 (called “EP 1993” and “ENV 1998” hereafter), 
both carried out by the Institut National de la Statistique de la Côte d'Ivoire (INS) and the World 
Bank.  
Table 1 shows that a large part of the Ivorian population is still not able to read and write. 
Illiteracy is particularly high in rural areas and for women. However, the evolution between 1993 
and 1998 shows that illiteracy decreases. The enrolment ratios also show a significant inequality 
between cities and rural areas. One can also state an abrupt fall of enrolment ratios after primary 
school and a strong difference between gross and net enrolment ratios.
3 This difference can be 
                                                 
2 The purpose of this study is similar to that of Ferreira and Leite (2002) who analyse the case of the Ceará Region 
(Brazil). However, they work with a constant population structure. Among the demographic variables, such as fertility, 
mortality, migration and marriage, only the distribution of education and the size of the households is taken into 
account. Furthermore, their analysis uses a comparative static framework, therefore it does not allow to reproduce the 
trajectory between the point of departure and arrival of individuals and households. 
3 The gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown. The net enrolment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of   5
explained by delayed entries in the schooling system, frequent schooling interruptions, and high 
repetition rates, in particular during the last two years of primary schooling. Girls are strongly 





(population 15 years and older) 
 
 Abidjan Other  urban  Rural 
  1993 1998 1993 1998  1993 1998 
Men  0.28 0.25 0.43 0.37  0.63 0.58 
Women  0.48 0.42 0.63 0.57  0.83 0.80 
All  0.38 0.33 0.53 0.47  0.73 0.69 





 Abidjan Other  urban  Rural 
  1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 
GERP  1.04 1.05 0.79 0.99 0.49 0.67 
NERP  0.69 0.69 0.52 0.63 0.32 0.45 
Girls-ratio 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.37 0.41 
        
GERJS  0.46 0.60 0.43 0.61 0.13 0.17 
NERPJS  0.14 0.24 0.12 0.21 0.04 0.04 
Girls-ratio 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.39 0.22 0.28 
        
GERUS  0.25 0.47 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.08 
NERUS  0.05 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 
Girls-ratio 0.36 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.12 0.30 
        
GERHE  0.03 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
NERHE  0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Girls-ratio 0.18 0.36 0.14 0.45 0.13 0.17 
Notes: GERP/NERP=Gross/net enrolment ratio in primary school; GERJS/NERJS=Gross/net enrolment ratio in 
junior secondary school; GERUS/NERUS= Gross/net enrolment ratio in upper secondary school; 
GERHE/NERHE= Gross/net enrolment ratio in higher education. 
Source: EP 1993, ENV 1998; computations by the author. 
2.3  Current education programmes 
The current education policy of Côte d’Ivoire focuses principally on three objectives (INS, 2001a):
5 
first, to achieve almost universal primary school enrolment, according to the aim fixed at the 
“World Conference on Education for All”, held in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990; second, to reduce 
gender inequality in terms of education; and third, to literate the adult population. The means by 
which the Ivorian authorities want to achieve these objectives are mainly orientated to the supply 
                                                                                                                                                                  
official school age (as defined by the education system) enrolled in school to the number of children of official school 
age in the population. 
4 A part of the increase may be due to measurement errors. In contrast to the ENV 1998, the EP 1993 was carried out in 
rural areas and in cities other than Abidjan during the summer holidays. It is thus possible that some children have been 
declared not enrolled even when an inscription for the following schooling year was envisaged. In other cases parents 
perhaps had not already decided. 
5 The increase of educational attainment is not only an auto-declared objective of the Ivorian authorities. The criteria of 
the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative also demand a rise of the budget allocated to education.   6
side. They contain, among others things, the construction of primary schools and education centres 
for adults, the reorganisation of education management, the pre-service and in-service training of 
teachers, the larger distribution of schooling materials such as textbooks, and the revision of 
curriculum content and implementation. These measures are supported by several Word Bank 
programmes (see World Bank, 2002a, 2002b).  
3  Model Structure 
3.1  Key characteristics of the model 
I use a dynamic microsimulation model designed to simulate at the individual level the most 
important demographic and economic events through time. The microsimulation approach allows to 
take into account individual heterogeneity, in particular regarding the capacity of accumulating 
human capital and earning income. Furthermore, it allows to analyse the policy outcomes in terms 
of inequality and poverty, and not only in terms of growth, as does an aggregated model. The 
dynamic approach is important to account for the time it takes to accumulate human capital and the 
occurring interactions with other economic and demographic variables during this period. The 
model applied is similar to simulation models used in industrialized countries to analyse pension 
reforms, the distribution of life-cycle incomes, or the accumulation of wealth.
6 The base unit is the 
individual, but each individual belongs in each period to a specific household. The model is a 
discrete time model. Each period corresponds to one year. I assume a fixed order concerning the 
different events: marriage, household formation, school enrolment, fertility, mortality, international 
immigration, reallocation of land, occupational choices, generation of individual earnings and 
household income. The population of departure is constructed using the EP 1993. This survey 
contains information about the socio-demographic characteristics of households and its members, 
their housing, education, employment, agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises, earnings, 
expenditures, and assets. From March to June 1992, 1680 households in Abidjan (economic capital 
of Côte d'Ivoire), and from June to November 1993, 7920 households from the rest of the country 
(among them 3360 in other Ivorian towns) were interviewed. The total sample covers 58014 
individuals. The sample was calibrated on January 1st 1993. Other data sources used are census 
data, United Nations’ demographic projections, a Demographic and Health Survey, a migration 
survey and another household income survey conducted in 1998. In what follows I briefly present 
the modelling of schooling, occupational choices, and earnings which constitute the central modules 
of the model. The modelling of the other behaviours is presented in appendix. For more details the 
reader can refer to Grimm (2002). In lack of longitudenal data, most regressions used are based on 
information derived from cross-section data. When using these regressions to simulate dynamic 
behaviour, we must of course make the strong assumption, that individuals behave over time as 
individuals of different ages observed in the base year. The most critical in doing this is that with 
cross-section data we cannot separate age, period, and cohort effects. 
3.2  Modelling of schooling decisions 
I use the information about current enrolment and enrolment in the previous year in the EP 1993 
and the ENV 1998 to estimate transition rates into and out of schooling. The models are estimated 
separately for boys and girls five to 25 years old using age, household composition, Ivorian 
citizenship, educational level already attained, matrimonial status, relation to the household head, 
land owned by the household, region of residence, and educational attainment of the father and the 
mother as explicative variables. Unfortunately, the used data set contains no information on the 
quality of the school, the distance to the school and the price of the school. The estimated 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Harding (2000) on dynamic microsimulation models and policy analysis.   7
coefficients of the corresponding probit models as well as a comparison of observed and simulated 
enrolment ratios for 1998 figure in Tables A1 and A2 in appendix. They show that the probability 
of school entry depends, as one can expect, strongly on age. It is higher for children with educated 
parents (notably for girls), and is lower for children in Non-Ivorian households. Furthermore, the 
probability of entry is higher if the child has already acquired some education in the past. The 
probability of staying in school depends positively on the educational level already attained, 
negatively on marriage and the quantity of land owned by the household, and is higher in urban 
areas, especially Abidjan. During the simulation, enrolment status is updated in each period for all 
children from five to 25 years old using the estimated coefficients and either a Monte Carlo lottery
7 
or fixed progression rates imposed according to the performed policy experiment. In the latter case, 
the estimated parameters are used to select the children with the highest empirical probability to 
experience the respective transition. As mentioned above, repetition of classes is very frequent in 
Côte d'Ivoire, especially before the entry into junior secondary school. To account for this 
phenomenon, I fixed the repetition rates at 20% for the fifth year of primary school, at 50% for the 
sixth year of primary school and at 10% for all other classes. However, when the school policy 
reforms set on, in 1998, it is assumed that these repetition rates are zero (see below). 
3.3  Modelling of occupational choices and earnings 
The labour income model draws from Roy's model (1951) as formalized by Heckman and Sedlacek 
(1986). It is competitive in the sense that no segmentation or job rationing prevail, but only slightly, 
because labour mobility across sectors does not equalize returns to observed and unobserved 
individual characteristics. The model is estimated using the EP 1993. It is assumed that each 
individual older than eleven years and out of school faces three kinds of work opportunities: (i) 
family work, (ii) self-employment, (iii) wage work. Family work includes all kinds of activities 
under the supervision of the household head, that is family help in agricultural or informal 
activities, but also domestic work, non-market labour and various forms of declared “inactivity”. 
Self-employment corresponds to informal independent activities. In agricultural households 
(households where some independent agricultural activity is carried out), the household head may 
be considered as a self-employed worker bound to the available land or cattle. Wage work concerns 
dependent employment principally in the formal public and private sectors. 
To both, non-agricultural self-employment and wage-work, individual potential earnings 
functions are associated which only depend on individual characteristics and on task prices: 
 ln  w1i = ln p1+X1i β1+t1i  (1) 
 ln  w2i = ln p2+X2i β2+t2i  (2) 
where for each individual i and for each labour market segment j=1,2, wji are individual potential 
earnings,  Xji are observable individual characteristics (human capital, place of dwelling, sex, 
nationality), tji are sector-specific unobservable individual productive abilities, and pj the price paid 
for each efficiency unit of labour. 
                                                 
7 Monte-Carlo lotteries within a microsimulation model consist of assigning to each individual i in the current period a 
certain probability for the occurrence of a given event, say a birth. This probability is drawn from an uniform law 
comprised between zero and one. The empirical probability that a woman experiences a birth during this period is 
calculated using a formerly estimated (econometrically, for instance) function, where her individual characteristics enter 
as arguments. If the randomly drawn number is lower than the empirical probability, then a birth is simulated. If the 
number of women is sufficiently high the aggregated number of births should be equal or very close to the sum of the 
individual empirical probabilities.   8
To family work, an unobserved individual value is associated that depends also on 
household characteristics, and on other members’ labour supply decisions: 
 ln  w0i = (X0i,Z0h)β0 + t0i  (3) 
where for each each individual i pertaining to household h, Z0h summarizes invariant household 
characteristics and other members decisions which influence labour market participation. 
To agricultural households, a reduced farm profit function derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
technology is associated: 
 ln  Π0h = ln p0 + α ln Lh + Zhθ + u0h  (4) 
where Π0h is the farm profit of household h (including self-consumption and minus hired labour) p0 
is the price of the agricultural good, Lh the total amount of labour available for agricultural activity, 
Zh other household characteristics like arable land, and u0h stands for unobservable idiosyncratic 
factors' global productivity. 
Then, when the household head is a farmer, secondary members may participate in farm 
work and therefore w0i is assumed to depend on the “individual’s contribution” to farm profits. This 
contribution is evaluated while holding fixed other members decisions and the global factor 
productivity of the farm u0h: 




h-i) + Zhθ + u0h  (5) 
where Lh+i = Lh and Lh-1 = Lh – 1 if i is actually working on the farm in h, and Lh+i = Lh + 1and Lh-1 = 
Lh alternatively. 
This means that the labour decision model is hierarchical between the household head and 
secondary members, and simultaneous “à la Nash” among secondary members (secondary members 
do not take into account the consequences of their activity choice on that of other secondary 
members). In the case of agricultural households, one may then rewrite the family work value as 
follows: 




h-i) + Zhθ] + t0i  (6) 
γ stands for the (non-unitary) elasticity of the value of family work in agricultural households to the 
price of agricultural products. For non-agricultural household members, w0 may be seen as a pure 
reservation wage, where the household head's earnings and other non-labour income of the 
household is introduced in order to account for an income effect on participation in the labour 
market. 
Comparing the respective values attributed to the three labour opportunities, workers 
allocate their labour force according to their individual comparative advantage: 
 i  chooses family work iff w0i > w1i and w0i > w2i   (7) 
 i  chooses self-employment iff w1i > w0i and w1i > w2i   (8) 
 i  chooses wage work iff w2i > w0i and w2i > w1i   (9) 
The following estimation strategy is adopted: (i) For non-agricultural households, the 
occupational choice/labour income model represented by equations (1) - (3) and the series of 
selection conditions (7) - (9) is estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood techniques; one   9
obtains a bivariate tobit, like in Magnac (1991). (ii) For agricultural households, a limited 
information approach is followed: in a first step, the reduced form profit function (4) is estimated, 
then an estimate for the individual potential contribution to farm production (5) is derived; in a 
second step, the reservation wage equation (6) is estimated and the individual potential contribution 
included, and, because of the small sample of rural wage workers, the wage functions (1) and (2) 
estimated for non-agricultural households are retained. Using this set of equations occupational 
choices and earnings are simulated in each period for each individual and household. The residual 
terms t1i, t2i, t0i, and u0h are first estimated for each individual/houshold and then kept constant over 
the whole simulation horizon. For individuals joining the sample by birth or migration, these error 
terms are drawn according to the estimated variance of these residuals and the correlation between 
them. 
Table A4 (appendix) shows the estimation results for non-agricultural household members, 
including the head. For education, returns are ordered as expected: the highest in the wage sector 
with a 17% increase for each additional year, and the lowest in the informal sector with only 7%. 
The impact of education on the reservation wage lies in between but close to the self-employment 
coefficient (10%). Returns to experience are similar in both the informal and formal sectors, while 
the reservation value follows an ever increasing parabola. All three values are higher in towns than 
in rural areas, wages getting a premium in Abidjan. Non-Ivorians have, as expected, a lower 
reservation value and are discriminated in the wage sector. Other things equal, they get 26% less 
than Ivorians, but not in self-employment. This is again the case for women for whom, other things 
equal, the competitive potential wage appears by 83% lower than for men. The reservation value for 
women is 22% lower than for men, but the effect of this variable should not be interpreted in 
isolation from the variables describing the relation to the head. Indeed household heads tend to 
participate most of the time and more frequently if they are female. Among household variables 
which only influence the reservation value, household head's income has the expected positive sign 
for secondary household members, although it is only hardly significant. The number and age 
structure of children has a small and mixed influence on participation on the labour market. The 
number of men in working age, but not that of women, tends to decrease participation. Table A3 
(appendix) shows the agricultural profit function, associated to the heads of agricultural households. 
The number of family workers has a coefficient that is consistent with usual values: a doubling of 
the work force leads to an approximately 50% increase in agricultural profits. The amount of arable 
land also comes out with a decreasing marginal productivity. Potential experience and sex of the 
household head are both significant, whereas education of the household was not significant and 
was withdrawn from the set of explanatory variables. All regions reveal a negative sign with respect 
to the Savannah region (North), which reflects the low relative prices for cocoa and coffee in 
contrast to cotton in the year of estimation 1992/93. Table A4 (appendix) shows the estimation 
results for secondary members of agricultural households. As noted before, self-employment benefit 
and wage functions have been constrained to be equal to those for non-agricultural households. Not 
surprisingly, people living in towns tend to work more often outside the family. This is also the case 
for women and immigrants, whatever their relation to the household head. The presence of children 
has no effect, while the number of working age men in the household still increases the reservation 
value of an individual. The above defined potential individual contribution to the agricultural profit 
increases the propensity to work on the farm with a reasonable elasticity of +0.3. 
Land is of course a key variable in the generation of agricultural income. Land is attributed 
in each household to the household head. If the household head leaves the household, for marriage 
for instance, land is attributed to the new household head. If the first-born boy of a household leaves 
for marriage, he receives 50% of the household’s land. The land of households which disappear, 
due to deaths of all its members, is reallocated within each strata among the households without 
land in equal parts and such that the proportions of households owning land remain constant with 
respect to 1993. At the end of each period the quantity of land is increased for each household by   10
3%, which is the approximate natural population growth rate in the model. Households switch to the 
agricultural sector⎯i.e. become an agricultural household⎯if the land they own exceeds a certain 
threshold level which I fixed at 0.1 ha, and in the opposite, they exit the agricultural sector⎯i.e. 
become a non-agricultural household⎯if land size falls under this threshold (in the base sample 
45.6% of the households are involved in independent agricultural activity (18.3% urban and 81.7% 
rural) and 54.4% are not (86.9% urban and 13.1% rural)). 
3.4  Transmission channels between education and income distribution in the model 
As a key determinant of wages and non-farm profits, education has, of course, direct effects on 
household income. Then education determines, besides other individual and household 
characteristics, activity choices of individuals who compare their potential remunerations in the two 
market activities with their reservation wage. Given that wage work offers the highest return to 
education, this activity becomes more and more lucrative when education increases. Furthermore, 
education influences negatively on fertility. Fertility is a key variable of the reservation wage and 
modifies the number of consumption units in the household and, in the long term, the quantity of 
labour supply available in the household. Finally, parental education influences schooling choices 
of their children and therefore also modifies the income and demographic behaviour of the 
children’s generation. However, the model does not account for direct effects from education on 
mortality, and especially from mother’s education on child mortality. 
4  Policy Experiments 
Three education policies, of which the last in four variants, plus a reference case are simulated. 
These experiments are in line with the education programmes debated or already in force in Côte 
d’Ivoire. They are summarized in Table 3 and explained in detail in what follows. The simulations 
start in 1993 and end in 2015. They are identical for all experiments until 1998. 
REFSIM, the reference simulation or baseline, consists in maintaining the enrolment ratios 
at the different schooling levels at those which Côte d’Ivoire would experience if the observed 
conditions in 1998 persisted, that is 50% of all children having achieved no or less than six years of 
schooling, 22% having achieved primary education, 20% having achieved junior secondary 
education, 6% having achieved upper secondary education and a little less than 2% having achieved 
at least one year of university education. These proportions imply progression rates between the 
different schooling levels of 40%, 30%, and 30%. The simulation works as follows: In 1998, 50% 
of all six years old children enter in primary school and stay there for six years until they obtain the 
CEPE. Those children with the highest empirical probability to be enrolled are selected. This 
probability is calculated using the estimated equation linking enrolment status to individual and 
household characteristics (see Table A1, appendix). Then 40% are selected out of those having 
achieved primary school, likewise according to their empirical probability to be enrolled. They will 
complete junior secondary school. Then the simulation continues in the same way for the following 
schooling levels. Furthermore, in the reference case as well as in all other simulations, the repetition 
rates are set to zero from 1998 on. 
PRIMED simulates the case of an almost universal primary school by assuming an entry rate 
of 90% for the generations being six years old in 1998 and younger. The desired net enrolment ratio 
is attained in 2003 when the sixth cohort enters in primary school. The selection of children and the 
simulation process works as in the reference case. 
HIGHED assumes, in addition to the 90% entry rate into primary school, progression rates 
between the following schooling levels of 60%, 60%, and 30% instead of 40%, 30%, and 30%.   11
Table 3 
Summary of the policy experiments 
 
  Schooling  Progr.  rate  1998 2005 2010 
Simulation level  from  1998  on  GER NER GER NER GER NER 
REFSIM  Primary  50%  77% 41% 59% 50% 50% 50%
  Junior  S.  40%  33% 7% 34% 25% 20% 20%
  Upper  S.  30%  14% 2% 10% 5% 6% 6%
  University  30%  2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
        
PRIMED  Primary  90%  77% 41% 100% 90% 90% 90%
  Junior  S.  22%  33% 7% 23% 20% 20% 20%
  Upper  S.  30%  14% 2% 5% 3% 6% 6%
  University  30%  2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1%
        
HIGHED  Primary  90%  77% 41% 100% 90% 90% 90%
  Junior  S.  60%  33% 7% 61% 47% 54% 54%
  Upper  S.  60%  14% 2% 27% 12% 34% 34%
  University  30%  2% 2% 3% 3% 7% 7%
            
ALPH⎯  HIGHED + 
  From 1998 on, in each period selection of 10% of men and 20% of women 
between 15 and 40 years old and being illiterate. Duration of programme: three 
years, then the years of schooling are set to two (literate). 
            
⎯CR  Constant return to education. 
⎯DR  Decreasing return to education: elasticity between the return to education in each 
sector and the share of the work force having more than five years of schooling of 
–1/3. 
⎯IR  Increasing return to education: elasticity between the return to education in each 
sector and the share of the work force having more than five years of schooling of 
+1/3. 
⎯SM  Maintenance of the share of the work force employed in the (formal) wage earner 
sector at the share simulated for 1997, which is 11.34%. 
Note: GER/NER = Gross/net enrolment ratio. 
ALPH completes the former simulation by an adult literacy programme. From 1998 on, in 
each period 10% of men and 20% of women between 15 and 40 years old and having less than two 
years of schooling are randomly selected. The literacy programme is supposed to last three years. 
Then the years of schooling of all participants are set to two. It is assumed that participants are able 
to work full-time when following the programme. To reduce gender inequality, I selected more 
women than men. This last experiment is performed under four different assumptions, three 
concerning the evolution of the return to education and one concerning the evolution of labour 
demand in the (formal) wage earner sector. 
 
•  First, one may think, according to neo-classical theory, that the entry of more and more 
educated individuals on the labour market reduces the return to education. Bils and Klenow 
(2000), for instance, found that countries with higher education levels experience lower 
returns. For example, as years of schooling go from two to six to ten, the implied income 
growth for one additional year of schooling falls from 21.6%, to 11.4% to 8.5%. In contrast, 
one may assume that the return to education increases if the expansion of education is 
accompanied by an increase of demand of education, due to technological progress or 
international trade, for instance. This last hypothesis was put forward by Katz and Murphy 
(1992) for the case of the United States. Finally, one may assume that the return to education 
remains constant (Card, 1995). For the decreasing-return-Scenario, ALPHDR, I set an 
elasticity between the return to education in each sector and the share of the work force (20   12
years and older) having more than five years of schooling to –1/3. That means if that share 
increases by 1%, the return to education decreases by 0.33%. In the case of increasing 
returns, ALPHIR, the elasticity is supposed to be +1/3. The share of the work force having 
more than five years of schooling increases in the simulation ALPH by approximately 3% per 
year. This implies that the return to education between 1998 and 2015 in the wage earner 
sector, for instance, increases from 17.1% to 20.5% under the hypothesis of increasing 
returns and decreases from 17.1% to 14.3% under the hypothesis of decreasing returns. 
ALPHCR indicates the constant-return-scenario. 
•  Another variant, ALPHSM, simulates the case of a segmented labour market. As mentioned 
in Section II (see also Table A4, appendix) more education renders wage work more and 
more lucrative compared to work in other sectors. However, in the Ivorian context it is less 
likely that labour demand in the wage earner sector, principally formal, increases without 
limit. The simulation consists in maintaining the share of the work force employed in the 
wage earner sector at the level simulated for 1997, which is 11.34%. The individuals who are 
rationed are, according to the efficiency wage theory (Bulow and Summers, 1986), those 
where the difference between their potential wage (given their individual characteristics) and 
their opportunity cost, which is ln(wwage)-max[ln(wself-empl.),ln(wreserv. wage)], is the lowest. The 
persons who are not selected are employed in the non-agricultural self-employment sector, if 
ln(wself-empl.) > ln(wreserv. wage), or they remain inactive or work on the family farm if ln(wself-
empl.) < ln(wreserv. wage). In this variant the return to education decreases because of rationing in 
the wage earner sector, sector which offers the highest return to education. The assumptions 
of this scenario correspond thus to another model than that implied by the simulations 
ALPHDR/IR. 
5  Results 
The following results are the output of simulations over a sub-sample of 10% of the EP 1993. The 
sample of departure comprises 5296 individuals living in 918 households. At the end of 2015, the 
sample comprises, depending on the experiment, between 11454 and 11739 individuals living in 
2234 and 2375 households, which corresponds to a demographic growth rate of approximately 
3,4% per year.
8 Each simulation is performed three times and the results are averages of these three 
repetitions. Stocks are always measured at the end of the year. All values are in CFA Francs 1998-
Abidjan, i.e. adjusted for regional price differences. 
5.1  Evolution of the level and the distribution of education 
Table 4 shows that a persistence of the conditions in the education system of 1998 (REFSIM) until 
2015 leads to a decrease of the illiteracy rate by two percentage points for men and five points for 
women. This is due to the disappearance of older, less educated generations and the apparition of 
younger, more educated generations. If primary education becomes almost universal (PRIMED), 
then these rates will even decline to 35% and 47%. However, only a huge adult literacy programme 
with a particular attention to women will reduce the illiteracy rate below 20% in the considered time 
scale (ALPHCR). The increase of enrolment ratios on all schooling levels (HIGHED) increases 
significantly the average years of schooling and reduces in particular the gender gap. 
Table 5, shows the policy outcome by generation. The experiment HIGHED conducts the 
generation born in 1995, being thus 20 years old in 2015, to an average schooling level of 8.7 years, 
which corresponds approximately to the average in Latin America of the generation born in 1970. 
                                                 
8 Ivorian Cenus data indicates a demographic growth rate of 3.3% for the period 1988 to 1998 (INS, 2001b).   13
The progress made by the Ivorian generations born between 1960 and 1990 under the assumption 
HIGHED is similar to that made by the Brazilian generations born between 1940 and 1970. 




Illiteracy rate and average years of schooling 













Illiteracy rate⎯men, 15 years and older 
REFSIM 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.44 -0.003 
PRIMED 0.46 0.44 0.39 0.35 -0.016 
HIGHED 0.46 0.44 0.39 0.34 -0.017 
ALPHCR 0.46 0.35 0.25 0.17 -0.054 
Illiteracy rate⎯women, 15 years and older 
REFSIM 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.59 -0.006 
PRIMED 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.47 -0.017 
HIGHED 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.48 -0.017 
ALPHCR 0.64 0.39 0.23 0.15 -0.078 
Average years of schooling⎯men, 20-25 years old 
REFSIM 5.50 4.81 5.05 5.18 -0.001 
PRIMED 5.51 4.30 4.45 6.69 0.013 
HIGHED 5.52 5.53 6.05 9.41 0.032 
ALPHCR 5.57 5.85 6.36 9.22 0.031 
Average years of schooling⎯women, 20-25 years old 
REFSIM 3.29 3.85 4.01 3.59 0.004 
PRIMED 3.29 3.62 3.48 5.90 0.032 
HIGHED 3.27 4.27 4.42 7.56 0.047 
ALPHCR 3.30 4.61 5.04 7.78 0.048 
Note: During the simulations it is assumed that individuals with less than two years of schooling are illiterate. 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
Table 5 
Average years of schooling by birth cohort simulated for Côte d’Ivoire 
for 2015 and observed for some other countries and regions in the 1990s 
 
  1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Simulation for Côte d’Ivoire 
REFSIM      2.8 3.6 4.4 4.5 4.0
PRIMED      3.0 3.5 4.3 4.7 6.4
HIGHED      3.0 3.5 4.8 6.2 8.7
ALPHCR      3.3 4.3 5.6 6.6 8.9
Observation for some other countries and regions 
Brazil 3.6 5.2 6.2 6.7      
Mexico 4.2 6.7 8.2 9.3      
Chile 7.1 8.9 10.1 11.1      
Latin America (Average)  5.3 6.9 8.2 8.8      
South Korea  7.7 9.5 11.0 12.0      
Taiwan 5.8 8.9 11.0 12.3      
Note: For the simulations, five-year birth cohorts are considered, 1958-62, 1968-72 … 
Source: For Côte d’Ivoire, simulations by the author. The data for the other countries and regions are taken from 
Behrmann, Duryea and Székély (1999, Table 1).   14
5.2  Impact on growth and the distribution of income 
The reader should note that even in the reference simulation income, inequality, and poverty are 
changing due to shifts in the population structure.
9 All scenarios draw a rather optimistic picture of 
the evolution of the Ivorian economy, but given the difficulty to predict the long run evolution of 
the economy and the structure of economic growth, the results should principally be interpreted in 
relation to the reference scenario and not in absolute terms. Over the period 1992 to 2015, the 
growth gain per capita of the most optimistic policy (ALPH) relative to the persistence of the status 
quo (REFSIM) is about 0.3 points per year if the return to education remains constant (ALPHCR),  
-0.9 points per year if the return to education decreases (ALPHDR) and 1.8 points per year if the 
return increases (ALPHIR) (see Table 6). As emphasized in Section 3, the empirical evidence 
concerning the relation between stock of education and returns to education is very controversial. In 
consequence the uncertainty of the possible results is very high. However, if the share of the work 
force employed in the (formal) wage sector remains rationed to that of 1997 (ALPHSM), which 
seems a rather likely scenario, no growth gain will be generated at all. The simulations show also 
that a policy which is limited to universal primary education (PRIMED) does not contribute to a 
further poverty reduction relative to the reference case. One explanation is that, in the early stages, 
the rise in schooling reduces the work force. The average household income per capita starts rising 
faster only after 2005, when the first better educated cohorts enter the labour market. Furthermore 
the return to education for up to six years of schooling is not sufficient to achieve significantly 
higher income. Purely universal primary education may only foster growth in the very long run, 
when a large part of the population has benefited from it. 
With exception of the experiment where the return to education rises (ALPHIR), the 
increase in inequality of the income distribution remains rather moderate.
10 The policy HIGHED 
produces a distribution slightly more unequal than that of the reference case. However, if HIGHED 
is completed by adult literacy programmes this difference disappears. Figure 1 superposes the 
evolution of income and that of the Gini index for the three return scenarios. Decreasing returns 
produce an inverse U-shaped evolution of inequality in the spirit of Kuznets (1955). Constant 
returns lead to a stabilization of income inequality from 2004 on and let expect a decrease in the 
long term. Finally, increasing returns produce an ever increasing Gini index. The Kuznets effect is 
usually considered in relation with the passage of workers from rural and poor areas to urban and 
richer areas. Kuznets (1955) concentrates only on the composition effect, i.e. the fact that an 
increased offer of skilled individuals raises, at least for a certain time and if the initial share of 
unskilled is not already too high, the inequality of income distribution. The simulations show 
however that a contraction of the returns to education accelerates the arrival of the phase of 
decreasing inequalities. 
                                                 
9 For a restrospective analysis of poverty and inequality changes in Côte d’Ivoire, see, for instance, Grootaert (1996), 
Grimm, Guénard and Mesplé-Somps (2002), and Grimm (2003). 
10 Although, the level of inequality has to be considered as very high, but it should be noted that in this model neither 
transfer income nor capital income is taken into account. The only income source is labour.   15
 
Table 6 
Income, inequality and poverty 
(simulations 1993 to 2015) 
(income in 1000 CFA Francs 1998-Abidjan, 
REFSIM in levels, other for levels in percentage deviations from REFSIM, 
and for growth rate in absolute deviations) 
 
  
1998 2005 2010 2015
growth p.a. 
1997-2015 
Mean household income  
REFSIM 1465  1664 1752 1852 1.42% 
PRIMED -0.1%  -1.0% -1.0% -1.8% -0.10 
HIGHED 0.5%  -1.7% -0.4% 0.5% 0.03 
ALPHCR -1.4%  -0.8% 0.8% 4.1% 0.23 
ALPHDR -2.0%  -9.7% -11.7% -15.8% -0.96 
ALPHIR -1.1%  8.1% 18.7% 37.9% 1.83 
ALPHSM -0.6%  -2.3% -2.4% -1.8% -0.10 
Mean household income per capita 
REFSIM 351  457 498 546 2.61% 
PRIMED -0.3%  -0.7% -0.6% -2.6% -0.15 
HIGHED 2.0%  -2.2% -0.6% -0.5% -0.02 
ALPHCR -0.3%  -2.0% 1.4% 5.3% 0.30 
ALPHDR -2.6%  -10.5% -11.4% -15.0% -0.92 
ALPHIR -1.1%  5.3% 17.9% 36.8% 1.80 
ALPHSM 0.0%  -4.2% 0.6% 0.9% 0.06 
Gini index of income per capita (households) 
REFSIM 0.598  0.609 0.609 0.609 0.18% 
PRIMED -0.2%  -0.8% -0.7% -1.0% -0.06 
HIGHED -0.8%  0.2% 1.0% 1.3% 0.07 
ALPHCR 0.0%  0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.00 
ALPHDR -0.7%  -3.1% -2.6% -4.8% -0.28 
ALPHIR -0.3%  2.5% 3.9% 6.9% 0.37 
ALPHSM -0.3%  -0.8% 0.2% 0.0% 0.00 
Head count ratio ($US 1 PPP) for income per capita (households) 
REFSIM 0.348  0.300 0.271 0.254 -1.75% 
PRIMED 0.0%  -2.0% -2.2% 0.0% -0.01 
HIGHED -0.3%  -0.7% 4.8% 4.3% 0.22 
ALPHCR 1.7%  -1.0% -0.7% -0.8% -0.05 
ALPHDR 0.6%  3.3% 7.0% 5.1% 0.27 
ALPHIR 0.0%  -3.0% -5.5% -10.6% -0.62 
ALPHSM 0.6%  0.7% 2.2% 2.4% 0.12 
Head count ratio ($US 1 PPP) for income per capita (individuals) 
REFSIM 0.411  0.384 0.362 0.345 -1.02% 
PRIMED 1.3%  1.1% 0.6% 2.5% 0.14 
HIGHED 1.8%  2.4% 5.1% 6.6% 0.35 
ALPHCR 1.8%  1.6% -1.2% 1.7% 0.09 
ALPHDR 2.0%  5.7% 6.9% 7.7% 0.41 
ALPHIR 2.6%  -2.6% -6.2% -7.9% -0.45 
ALPHSM 2.5%  1.4% 3.3% 4.0% 0.21 
Notes: Simulations by the author.   16
 
Figure 1 





































































Source: Simulations by the author.   17
Figure 2 
Relative changes of mean household income per capita by percentiles 


















 ALPHCR  ALPHDR
 ALPHIR  ALPHSM





Note: The distributions are truncated for the first five percentiles, because zero incomes at the bottom of the distribution 
lead to very erratic relative changes. 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
Figure 2 shows the relative changes with respect to REFSIM of mean household income per 
capita for each percentile of the distribution in 2015. ALPHCR leads to an improvement beyond the 
25th percentile. Increasing returns have a clear positive effect over the total distribution with huge 
relative income changes at the top of the distribution. In contrast, decreasing returns lead to income 
losses relative to the reference scenario over the entire distribution. For the experiment ALPHSM 
the potential gains stemming from the education expansion are over compensated until the 60th 
percentile through the rationing of (formal) wage work, only above incomes exceeding those of the 
reference case. 
5.3  Indirect effects through the different transmission channels 
Inactivity decreases in all policy experiments (Table 7), but this decrease is the more pronounced 
the more individuals have acquired education, the more education is remunerated, and the easier 
(formal) wage work is accessible. Particularly interesting is the difference between the policies 
PRIMED, on the one hand, and HIGHED and ALPHCR, on the other hand: an expansion of 
education up to primary school does not render sufficiently attractive the entry on the labour 
market. This is in particular the case for women. According to the used labour supply model, an 
“average women” living in a non-agricultural household has to achieve at least upper secondary 
school so that her potential earnings drawn from wage work compensate her reservation wage. This 
result is in line with those of other studies. Lam and Duryea (1999) show, for instance, that in Brazil 
the increase in domestic productivity following an expansion of education is sufficiently high to 
compensate the increase of potential earnings on the labour market corresponding to eight years of 
schooling. Likewise, Behrman Foster, Rosenzweig et al. (1999) find for the case of India positive 
and high returns to education for women in domestic activity. 
The decrease of inactivity results principally in an increase of wage work and non-farm self-
employment. Wage work is more attractive the higher the return to education. For the experiment   18
ALPHIR, the share of wage earners grows from 11.3% to 16.4% between 1997 and 2015 reducing 
inactivity and domestic work (including work on the family farm). In contrast, the rationing of wage 
work to 11.3% of the total work force (ALPHSM) increases particularly the inactivity rate, and to a 
smaller extend the share of non-farm self-employment. 
 
Table 7 
Employment structure, individuals older than 11 years, not enrolled 













REFSIM  0.158 0.120 0.127 0.174 0.421 
PRIMED  0.165 0.121 0.125 0.171 0.418 
HIGHED  0.148 0.128 0.120 0.184 0.420 
ALPHCR  0.147 0.136 0.122 0.181 0.414 
ALPHDR  0.167 0.115 0.118 0.184 0.417 
ALPHIR  0.129 0.164 0.121 0.183 0.403 
ALPHSM  0.163 0.114 0.122 0.185 0.416 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
 
Table 8 
Total fertility rate (TFR)
1, mean household size, and dependency ratio
2 








REFSIM  4.305 4.933 1.008 
PRIMED  4.315 4.963 1.035 
HIGHED  4.124 4.968 1.095 
ALPHCR  3.977 4.914 1.053 
ALPHDR  3.955 4.886 1.119 
ALPHIR  3.955 4.868 0.979 
ALPHSM  3.876 4.856 1.118 
Note: 
1 Average number of children born by a woman who would be exposed during her entire fertility cycle to the 
currently observed age-specific fertility rates. The presented numbers are the averages over the period 2013-
2015. 
2 Ratio between inactive household members and active household member (agricultural family workers 
count as active). 
Source: Simulation by the author. 
Concerning the demographic transmission channels (see Table 8), one can state a decrease 
of the total fertility rate (TFR) from 5.0 to 4.3 children per woman between 1997 and 2015. Given 
that woman’s education is a key determinant in the fertility model used, this decrease is stronger, 
the higher the schooling level of women. In the long term the difference of 0.33 children between 
the experiments REFSIM and ALPHCR will increase, because the cohort being six years old in 
1998 attains only the age of 24 in 2015 and is therefore still at the beginning of its fertility cycle. 
Furthermore, in the model it is supposed that the preferences regarding fertility are constant, which 
is less likely to happen in reality. A significant expansion of education will probably change fertility 
behaviour in general, by diffusion of knowledge and contraception technologies for instance, and 
incite every couple independently of their own education to limit its births. The mean household 
size decreases by about 0.75 persons between 1992 and 2015 for every scenario considered. In 
contrast, the dependency ratio decreases strongly, but differently for the considered experiments. As 
already mentioned, the expansion of education has two effects: (i) an increase of enrolment rates 
reduces in the early stages the work force, but (ii) raises, once the cohorts attain the age of activity 
their propensity to work on the labour market because of the positive return to education. This can   19
explain why the dependency ratio decreases the most under ALPHIR and the less under ALPHDR 
and ALPHSM. 
To sum up, in the medium and long term more education decreases fertility and increases 
the participation rates on the labour market, in particular for women, if the education expansion is 
sufficiently strong. This results in a contraction of the dependency ratio which finally raises mean 
household income per capita. These are the indirect effects which complete the increase of income 
due to higher schooling, holding participation behaviour and demographic behaviour constant. 
6  Conclusion 
If the most optimistic policy considered in this study were really set up, the cohorts born in 1995 
and after would achieve an education level when they enter the labour market which corresponds to 
the average in Latin America of the cohort born in 1970. The effect of such an expansion of 
education in terms of income growth, inequality and poverty in the coming 15 years depends very 
crucially on the assumptions made for the evolution of returns to education and labour demand. 
Over the period 1992-2015, the growth gain per capita relative to the persistence of the 1998 age-
schooling pattern is about 0.3 points per year if returns to education remain constant, about -0.9 
point per year if returns decrease by about 20%, and about 1.8 points per year if returns increase by 
about 20%. If the labour demand in the (formal) wage earner sector remains rationed to the share of 
the total work force observed in 1997 (11.34%) no growth gain at all will be generated. A much 
quicker poverty reduction relative to the reference scenario may only be possible with rising returns 
to education and an increasing demand for skilled work. Otherwise the expansion of education will 
have only a minor effect, at least in the considered time scale, on the headcount index, among other 
things, because the poor population is only marginally concerned by higher enrolment rates in 
secondary and higher education.
11 In other words, the simulations show, that a policy which is 
limited to universal primary education, is not sufficient to eradicate poverty. These results thus 
suggest that an expansion of education has to be accompanied by a policy attracting investment and 
creating demand for skilled labour. To achieve increasing returns to education, it is necessary that 
other production factors, complementary to education, such as physical capital and technological 
progress, increase simultaneously. Furthermore, expanding school enrolment may lead to a decline 
in school quality, since new teachers must be hired and teacher training standards may have to be 
lowered to find enough teachers.
12 Therefore measures have to be undertaken to ensure a certain 
quality standard of schooling such that returns to education do not fall. The fact that education is not 
a sufficient condition for poverty alleviation does not lessen its importance, but rather raises the 
importance of undertaking complementary reforms that will lead education to pay off. Furthermore, 
as emphasized in the introduction, education induces many other beneficial effects, such as lower 
child mortality. 
The picture drawn by this study may have been even more pessimistic, if I had taken into 
account possible general equilibrium effects and the negative effects of financing the considered 
policies. Future work should also investigate what precise type of policy may be adapted in the case 
of Côte d’Ivoire to achieve the expansion of education simulated in this study.
13 
 
                                                 
11 This is in line with the evidence presented in Li, Steele and Glewwe (1999). They found in a study based on relatively 
large sample of developing countries that the share of the richest income quintile in public spending on education (28%) 
was more than double that of the poorest income quintile (13%). 
12 This may pose a problem especially in Côte d’Ivoire, given that this country is significantly hit by the AIDS 
epidemic.   20
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Appendix 
Estimated parameters used for the schooling decisions model 
 
Table A1 
Probit estimations of the probability of being enrolled in t conditional on the state in t-1 
(children between 5 and 25 years old) 
 
  Children not enrolled in t -1 
Variables Boys  Girls 
Age 1.352 *  (0.135) 0.932 *  (0.108) 
Age²/100 -12.872 *  (1.286) -9.304 *  (0.993) 
Age
3/1000 3.048 *  (0.312) 2.287 *  (0.239) 
No diploma (Ref.)             
Prim. attained  1.584 *  (0.271) 0.873 *  (0.252) 
Junior sec. attained
a 2.214 *  (0.436) 1.542 *  (0.326) 
Upper sec. attained  2.011 *  (0.570)      
Married            
Non-Ivorian -0.394 *  (0.063) -0.291 *  (0.066) 
Not child of the head  0.299 *  (0.063) 0.209 *  (0.067) 
Father illiterat. (Ref.)             
Father knows read./writ.  0.327 *  (0.085) 0.305 *  (0.092) 
Father prim. attained  0.481 *  (0.080) 0.647 *  (0.081) 
Father junior sec. attained  0.788 *  (0.110) 0.652 *  (0.110) 
Father upper sec. att. and +  0.986 *  (0.178) 1.193 *  (0.179) 
Mother illiterat. (Ref.)             
Mother knows read./writ.  0.242 *  (0.096) 0.429 *  (0.096) 
Mother prim. attained  0.390 *  (0.103) 0.416 *  (0.108) 
Mother junior sec. attained  0.242   (0.202) 0.774 *  (0.186) 
Mother upper sec. att. and +  1.815 *  (0.576) 0.700 *  (0.275) 
Household head male        -0.124   (0.104) 
# househ. memb. ≥ 60 years  -0.086   (0.048)      
Household size        0.014 *  (0.005) 
Abidjan (Ref.)             
Other urban  -0.310 *  (0.071) -0.311 *  (0.068) 
East Forest  -0.608 *  (0.089) -0.668 *  (0.087) 
West Forest  -0.636 *  (0.090) -0.536 *  (0.089) 
Savannah -0.608 *  (0.086) -0.659 *  (0.085) 
ENV 1998  0.319 *  (0.051) 0.430 *  (0.051) 
Constant -4.833 *  (0.401) -3.810 *  (0.348) 
Number of observations  11861  14680 
Log likelihood  -2048  -1793 
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Table A1 (cont.) 
 
  Children enrolled in t -1 
Variables Boys  Girls 
Age 0.062 *  (0.030) -0.043 * (0.012) 
Age²/100 -0.424 *  (0.106)      
No diploma (Ref.)             
Prim. attained  -0.005   (0.075) -0.022   (0.087) 
Junior sec. attained  0.372 *  (0.126) 0.517 * (0.165) 
Upper sec. attained  0.499 *  (0.197) 0.232  (0.287) 
Married -0.980 *  (0.179) -0.884 * (0.161) 
Not child of the head        -0.155 * (0.071) 
Mother illiterat. (Ref.)             
Mother knows read./writ.        0.242   (0.132) 
Mother prim. attained        -0.119   (0.133) 
Mother junior sec. attained        0.324   (0.244) 
Mother upper sec. att. and +        0.659   (0.400) 
# househ. memb. ≥ 60 years        -0.105   (0.057) 
Household size  0.023 *  (0.008)      
Househ. without land (Ref.)             
0ha < lands. < 1ha  -0.068   (0.126) 0.364 * (0.148) 
1ha ≤ lands. < 2ha  -0.307 *  (0.117) -0.432 * (0.145) 
2ha ≤ lands. < 5ha  -0.371 *  (0.114) -0.216  (0.120) 
5ha ≤ lands. < 10ha  -0.228 *  (0.126) -0.060  (0.133) 
10ha ≤ lands.  0.032   (0.135) 0.096   (0.136) 
Abidjan (Ref.)             
Other urban  -0.267 *  (0.081) -0.262 * (0.085) 
East Forest  -0.520 *  (0.127) -0.519 * (0.135) 
West Forest  -0.448 *  (0.129) -0.366 * (0.150) 
Savannah -0.193   (0.142) -0.243   (0.155) 
ENV 1998  0.574 *  (0.064) 0.588 * (0.074) 
Constant 1.388 *  (0.201) 2.111 * (0.132) 
Number of observations  8535  5835 
Log likelihood  -2146  -1471 
Notes: 
a The categories “junior secondary” and “upper secondary” have been aggregated for girls non-enrolled in t-1 * 
significant at 5%. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors have been corrected for clustering within the 
household. During the simulations the dummy for the 1998 survey (ENV 1998) comes successively into play by 
multiplying its coefficient in each period by t/5 so that the coefficient has no effect in 1993 and an effect of 100% 
in 1998. From 1998 on this dummy variable is fixed to one. 
Source: EP 1993, ENV 1998; estimations by the author.   25
Table A2 
Observed and simulated enrolment ratios in 1998 
 
  obs.   sim.    obs.   sim. 
GERP 0.81  0.84  GERUS  0.21  0.15 
NERP 0.53  0.51  NERUS  0.05  0.02 
Girls-ratio 0.44 0.43  Girls-ratio 0.35 0.27 
         
GERJS 0.39  0.39  GERHE  0.03  0.01 
NERJS 0.13  0.08  NERHE  0.02  0.01 
Girls-ratio 0.38 0.40  Girls-ratio 0.35 0.08 
Notes: GERP/NERP=Gross/net enrolment ratio in primary school; GERJS/NERJS=Gross/net enrolment ratio in junior 
secondary school; GERUS/NERUS= Gross/net enrolment ratio in upper secondary school; GERHE/NERHE= 
Gross/net enrolment ratio in higher education. 
Source: ENV 1998; computations and simulations by the author. 
 
Estimated parameters used for the of occupational choices and earnings model 
 
Table A3 
Agricultural profit function 
(Dependent variable log profit last 12 month) 
(OLS estimation) 
 
Variables    
Log of no. of household members involved in farm work  0.531 *  (0.026) 
Land: no land or less than 1 ha (Ref.)     
Land: from 1 to 2 ha  0.349 *  (0.043) 
Land: from 2 to 5 ha  0.553 *  (0.042) 
Land: from 5 to 10 ha  0.897 *  (0.047) 
Land: more than 10 ha  0.964 *  (0.052) 
Experience 0.012  *  (0.004) 
Experience²/100 -0.022  *  (0.005) 
Woman -0.136  *  (0.042) 
Savannah (Ref.)     
Urban -0.554  *  (0.038) 
East Forest  -0.329 *  (0.035) 
West Forest  -0.230 *  (0.035) 
Intercept 12.304  *  (0.089) 
Number of observations  4204 
Adj. R²   0.319 
Notes: * significant at 5%. Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: EP 1993; estimations by the author.   26
Table A4 
Activity choice and labour income model 
(Dependent variable log monthly earnings) 
(Bivariate Tobit estimation, i.e. all three equations are estimated simultaneously) 
 
Variables Non-farm  self-empl. Wage  earner  Reserv.  wage 
NON-AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
Schooling  0.069 * (0.004) 0.171 * (0.004)  0.101 *  (0.005)
Experience  0.078 * (0.005) 0.080 * (0.005)  -0.011 *  (0.006)
Experience²/100  -0.074 * (0.007) -0.094 * (0.008)  0.059 *  (0.008)
Abidjan  0.348 * (0.047) 0.529 * (0.042)  0.358 *  (0.056)
Other urban  0.300 * (0.043) 0.257 * (0.038)  0.100 *  (0.052)
Woman  0.042   (0.038) -0.830 * (0.035)  -0.217 *  (0.045)
Non-Ivorian -0.030    (0.032) -0.261 * (0.030)  -0.215 *  (0.036)
# childr. 0-1 years old in hh.                0.038  (0.024)
# childr. 1-3 y. old in hh.               -0.018  (0.018)
# childr. 3-9 y. old in hh.          -0.035 *  (0.017)
# childr. 9-12 y. old in hh.          0.028 *  (0.013)
# men >11 y. old in hh.
1       0.026  *  (0.007)
# women >11 y. old in hh.
1        -0.002    (0.007)
Household head          -1.177 *  (0.040)
Spouse of h. head.          -0.168 *  (0.033)
Child of h. head.          0.189 *  (0.036)
Other hh. member (Ref.)             
Income of h. head./1000000                0.009  (0.006)
Intercept 8.472  *   (0.109)   8.600 *   (0.100)   10.586 *  (0.115)
Number of observations  14369 
Log likelihood  -87881 
            
AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
Schooling 0.069 (⎯) 0.171 (⎯)       0.026  (0.020)
Experience 0.078 (⎯)  0.080 (⎯)      -0.005  (0.016)
Experience²/100 -0.074 (⎯)  -0.094 (⎯)        0.033  (0.022)
Abidjan 0.348 (⎯)  0.529 (⎯)       -0.241  (0.259)
Other urban  0.300 (⎯)  0.257 (⎯)  -0.576 *  (0.155)
Woman 0.042 (⎯)  -0.830 (⎯)  -0.764 *  (0.108)
Non-Ivorian -0.030 (⎯)  -0.261 (⎯)  -0.513 *  (0.095)
# childr. 0-1 years old in hh.                0.067  (0.056)
# childr. 1-3 y. old in hh.               -0.050  (0.040)
# childr. 3-9 y. old in hh.               -0.003  (0.047)
# childr. 9-12 y. old in hh.                    0.036  (0.037)
# men >11 y. old in hh.
1         0.056  * (0.022)
# women >11 y. old in hh.
1               -0.018  (0.018)
Spouse of h. head.               -0.002  (0.074)
Child of h. head.                0.022  (0.077)
Other hh. Member (Ref.)             
ln ∆Π0i      0.316 *  (0.095)
Intercept 8.472 (⎯)  8.600   (⎯)   9.095 *  (0.905)
Number of observations  9884 
Log likelihood  -7660 
Notes: The estimates of the corresponding variance and correlation parameters can be obtained upon request from the 
author. * significant at 5%. (⎯) coefficient constrained. 
1 without accounting for the individual itself.  
Source: EP 1993; estimations by the author.   27
Modelling of fertility, mortality, marriage, and immigration 
In what follows I briefly explain how fertility, mortality, marriage and immigration is modelled. For 
more details, regarding the data used, estimation techniques and estimation results, the reader can 
refer to Grimm (2002). 
Fertility 
I use the Ivorian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 1994 (INS, 1995a) to model births. The 
weighted sample is representative of the national level and covers 5935 households, comprising 
8099 women between 15 and 49 years old. The survey contains questions concerning the socio-
demographic structure of households, fertility, health, education, employment and some assets 
owned by households. Fertility is estimated by a reduced form probit equation. The dependant latent 
variable measures the probability that woman i had a birth the twelve months preceding the survey. 
The observed dependant variable is whether the woman had a birth or not during this period. 
Among the exogenous variables are matrimonial status, region of residence, both interacted with 
age and age squared, and education. To control for polygamy, I also introduce the number of other 
women between 15 and 49 years old in the household. The main characteristics of the estimated 
model are, that the birth probability increases with marriage, rural residence, and age (at a 
decreasing rate). In contrast, it decreases with education, the number of other women in the 
household, and residence in Abidjan. Using the estimated equation and a Monte Carlo lottery, it is 
determined if a women gives birth in a specific period or not. The sex of a child is coded with a 
probability of 48.8% female. 
Mortality 
To model mortality, I computed mortality tables using (i) the Ivorian United Nations’ projections 
(United Nations, 2001) for infant mortality, juvenile mortality and life expectancy at birth for the 
period 1990 to 2020, and (ii) Ledermann model life tables (Ledermann, 1996). The United Nations’ 
projections include a with AIDS and a without AIDS scenario. AIDS mortality is introduced in the 
mortality tables such that it concerns only children up to five years and adults between 20 and 59 
years old. These tables together with a Monte Carlo lottery are used to simulate in each period 
deaths. For survivors the age variable is increased in each period by one year. 
Marriage 
Only the first marriage is modelled. All single men between 18 and 49 years old and all single 
women between 13 and 43 years old are considered as at risk to marry. Those who “search” are 
selected among them using a Mote Carlo lottery and marriage rates stratified by age, sex, and 
residence (urban, rural) estimated by the INS (1992) using census data. To arrange marriages, I first 
stock the chosen men and women for each stratum (Abidjan, other cities, West Forest, East Forest, 
Savannah) in a matrix representing the different marriage markets. Then each matrix is sorted by 
education in descending order. I assume that men chose women. A parameter 0<=ϕ=1 defines the 
degree of “assortive mating” Becker (1991). If ϕ is equal to one, the most educated man chooses the 
most educated woman in the corresponding stratum, under the condition that the man is not younger 
than the woman, and that the woman lives not in the same household as the man, otherwise he 
chooses the second most educated woman and so on. The second most educated man chooses then 
the next “available” most educated women and so on. For ϕ=0.5, 50% of men choose their wife 
conditioning on education and 50% choose randomly. For ϕ=0 all men choose randomly. The 
“homogamous” men are selected randomly and independently of their education. However, the 
selection process runs always in descending order, with the most educated man choosing first. This 
modelling is coherent with matching models in the sense that it is assumed that individuals act in an   28
environment where information is perfect. There are no search costs. Matches are influenced by the 
conditions on the marriage markets, i.e. the dispersion of potential spouses and the ratio between 
potential spouses and competitors. For the simulations ϕ was calibrated at 0.8. The marriage is 
concluded by an exchange of identification codes. Individuals who find no partner remain single 
and have a chance to be selected in the next period. For married couples there are three modes of 
cohabitation: (i) the couple forms their own new household, (ii) the couple lives with his parents, 
and (iii) the couple lives with her parents. The probabilities for these three possibilities are 
calibrated at 70%, 15%, and 15% respectively. In new households the man is coded household 
head. 
Immigration 
To model net immigration into Côte d'Ivoire, I use immigration matrices stratified by age and sex 
based on the Enquête Ivoirienne sur les Migrations et l'Urbanisation of 1993 (EIMU) (INS, 1995b). 
This survey covers 16125 households (58378 individuals) and is considered as representative of the 
national level. The number of immigrants is determined in each period by applying the net 
immigration rate by age group and sex to the number of resident individuals of the same age group 
and sex. The entrants are created by duplicating already resident immigrants (only matrimonial 
status is systematically coded as not married). Then the immigrant is affected with a probability of 
70% to a randomly chosen resident, but former immigrated, family (of course not that of his/her 
double) and with a probability of 30% he/she creates his/her own single household. The affectation 
to a formerly immigrated family translates the idea of migration networks, particularly important in 
Côte d'Ivoire. 